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AbstrAct
This paper takes the Chinese listed company with the equity refinancing qualification from 
2012 to 2013 as the research object, and uses the residual revenue model to calculate the equi-
ty financing cost. This paper discusses the impact of the overconfidence of executives on the 
equity financing cost and its impact mechanism. The unique institutional background exam-
ines the differences in property rights characteristics. The research found that: (1) executive 
overconfidence has a negative impact on the cost of equity financing, executives tend to be 
overconfident, the higher the equity financing cost of the company; (2) the overconfidence of 
executives to state-owned enterprises compared to private enterprises The negative impact of 
financing costs is more significant; (3) in addition, this paper also examines the potential im-
pact mechanism of executive overconfidence on the cost of equity financing. The quality of in-
formation disclosure and the risk of investor prediction have a mediating effect on the impact 
of executive overconfidence on equity financing costs.
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1. introduction
the influencing factors of equity financing costs are long-term hot issues in capital market research. As the main basis for enterprise investment and 
financing decision-making, the accurate measurement of 
equity financing cost is not only beneficial to guide the 
flow of funds in the capital market, but also has important 
practical significance for improving the financial deci-
sion-making level and performance value of the company. 
The research on the factors affecting the cost of equity 
financing, domestic and foreign scholars mainly from the 
micro and macro levels: the micro level includes factors 
such as company characteristics, information disclosure 
and corporate governance; the macro level considers ex-
ternal governance environmental factors such as investor 
protection and political relations. A large number of do-
mestic and foreign literatures examine the impact of infor-
mation disclosure on equity financing costs. Based on the 
theory of information asymmetry, the existing theoretical 
research believes that due to the information asymmetry 
between the management and investors of the enterprise 
and the existence of the investor's predicted risk, the 
lower level of corporate information disclosure makes 
the information between the enterprise and the investor. 
Asymmetry is further aggravated. Investors will face 
higher estimated risks when estimating future earnings. 
Potential investors will inevitably demand higher return 
on investment, which in turn will lead to an increase in 
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corporate financing costs. That is, the lower the level of 
corporate information disclosure, the higher the cost of 
equity financing[1,2,3].
As mentioned above, the academic research on the cost 
of equity financing is based on the rational human hypoth-
esis of the neoclassical economic theory. The influencing 
factors are mainly limited to the internal and external 
aspects of the enterprise, and less attention is paid to the 
individual psychological characteristics of the execu-
tive group. Equity financing cost research has achieved 
more results, but the rational person hypothesis does not 
match the management's prevailing tendency of over-
confidence. In addition, most of the research on manage-
ment's overconfidence is limited to the internal financial 
decision-making level, and less on how executive over-
confidence affects the judgment of external stakeholders, 
including potential investors, on corporate value and risk.
Since Hambrick et al. proposed management's 
high-level theory, research scholars have begun to pay 
attention to the impact of managerial characteristics on 
corporate behavior and external stakeholders. Behavioral 
finance introduces psychology into the field of corporate 
finance research, explaining how managerial personality 
traits influence management's behavioral decisions. Over-
confidence is one of the most robust findings in psychol-
ogy. A large body of research literature shows that people 
tend to show a tendency to be overconfident in economic 
activities. Psychology and behavioral finance studies have 
also confirmed that people's behavior is not completely ra-
tional due to the existence of overconfident cognitive bias. 
Because the manager is at the top of the organizational 
structure of the enterprise and is in the core decision-mak-
ing position, he will have more information than the aver-
age employee, plus the successful management experience 
accumulated over the years. Therefore, managers are more 
likely to show excessive self-confidence in the process of 
business decision-making. A lot of empirical research has 
also proved that management does have the characteristics 
of overconfidence, which is characterized by their easy 
systemic cognitive bias on the project's benefits and risks, 
which is reflected in the fact that overconfident executives 
can easily overestimate the project's benefits. Level or 
underestimate the risk level of the project, overestimate 
your ability level and master the accuracy of the informa-
tion[4,5]. The above performance must be reflected in the 
irrationality of corporate decision-making[3]. the irrational 
decision-making caused by the overconfidence of execu-
tives, many scholars at home and abroad have conducted 
a lot of research and achieved a series of research results. 
The research found that executive overconfidence can 
affect the company's dividend distribution, investment 
mergers and acquisitions, earnings forecast, company 
performance, accounting stability, etc[4,5,6,7,8,9]. From re-
cent research, scholars have been paying attention to the 
economic consequences of irrational decision-making by 
executive overconfidence companies. The research found 
that executives' overconfidence led the company to adopt 
a radical financing strategy by influencing the company's 
investment behavior, and its economic consequences were 
the rise in equity financing costs[10].
Different from the existing research, this paper ex-
plores the impact of the overconfidence bias of executives 
on the cost of equity financing of enterprises based on the 
perspective of information disclosure. The answer to the 
above questions helps us to deepen the irrational psycho-
logical characteristics of managers. It has theoretical and 
practical value to influence external stakeholders and their 
corresponding economic consequences. Therefore, this 
paper attempts to explain three questions: (1) How does 
the overconfidence bias of executives affect the cost of eq-
uity financing? (2) What is the mechanism of the influence 
of executive overconfidence on the cost of equity financ-
ing? (3) In the enterprises with different property rights, is 
there any difference in the influence of the overconfidence 
bias of the executives on the equity financing costs of the 
enterprises?
The possible contributions of this paper are: firstly, 
using behavioral finance theory to extend the influence 
of executive overconfidence on other stakeholders to the 
level of potential investors, providing empirical data on 
the relationship between executive overconfidence and 
equity financing costs. Research has made up for the 
shortcomings of the existing literature; secondly, based 
on the transmission mechanism of information disclosure 
affecting the cost of equity financing, this paper helps to 
understand the decisive factors of the pricing of equity 
financing market and provide the deep motivation for the 
overconfidence of executives to affect the cost of equity 
financing. Moreover, the existing research on the cost of 
equity financing is mainly localized in the internal char-
acteristics of the company and the external environment, 
and the internal characteristics of the company are closely 
related to the executives. This paper extends the research 
to the individual characteristics of management and may 
further deepen the research results in this field.
2. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypoth-
esis
Many domestic and foreign literatures examine the impact 
of information disclosure on equity financing costs from 
both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
the theoretical research level agrees that the princi-
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ple of information disclosure affecting the cost of equity 
financing can be described as two types of mechanisms: 
First, the perspective of information disclosure. The hy-
pothesis believes that information disclosure can reduce 
information asymmetry between management and inves-
tors, reduce the transaction cost of stocks, enhance stock 
liquidity, and thus reduce the cost of equity financing; 
second, the perspective of investor risk prediction. When 
information disclosure is low, investors will bear the risk 
of predicting future utility. If this risk is not diversified, 
investors will demand a higher return on the information 
risk, that is, information disclosure will reduce the cost of 
equity financing by reducing the estimated risk of stock 
returns.
The empirical research level measures information dis-
closure from the aspects of quantity and quality of infor-
mation disclosure, and empirically tests the relationship 
between information disclosure and equity financing costs. 
Botosan et al., Wei Wang and Gaofeng Jiang are scholars 
who have carried out related research earlier at home and 
abroad. They choose the amount of information disclosure 
as a surrogate indicator of information disclosure. The 
empirical results show that there is a negative correlation 
between information disclosure and the cost of equity fi-
nancing[11,12,13]. In the recent research literature, the quality 
indicators of earnings disclosure quality have begun to 
be adopted by research scholars. bhattacharya and other 
scholars try to use income smoothness to measure the 
transparency of earnings, and examine the impact of in-
formation disclosure quality on the cost of equity capital 
from the national level. Their research found that the more 
opaque the country, the higher the cost of equity capital[14]. 
Domestic scholars have used the data of listed companies 
in China to conduct empirical tests. The conclusions of 
bhattacharya and other scholars have reached the same 
conclusion. The quality of information disclosure of listed 
companies in China is significantly positively correlated 
with the cost of equity financing[15,16].
Based on the foregoing analysis, there are two types 
of mechanisms for the influence of managerial over-
confidence on the cost of equity financing: First, the 
information disclosure mechanism. Executives with over-
confidence are more likely to adopt aggressive earnings 
management. Hriber and Yang's research found that when 
executives are overconfident, companies tend to release 
optimistic earnings forecasts and adopt more aggressive 
business strategies. When actual earnings fail to reach 
predictive targets, they are forced by capital market pres-
sures. It is forced to report earnings through aggressive 
positive earnings management[17], which will inevitably re-
duce the quality of information disclosure and worsen the 
information asymmetry between enterprises and investors, 
and enterprises will face higher equity financing costs. 
Second, in order to whitewash the report, overconfident 
executives may have a motive for smooth performance for 
earnings management. The reason is that overconfident 
managers tend to overestimate their own ability level or 
the accuracy of the information they have, thus over-opti-
mistic expectations of corporate earnings, overestimating 
the probability of revenue growth, and underestimating 
the probability of a decline in earnings. Therefore, when 
the company's performance is not good (such as below 
the refinancing conditions), overconfident managers tend 
to report more surplus by accelerating the recognition 
of income, delaying the reporting fee and other accruals 
management methods, and the company's performance is 
better (such as exceeding refinancing conditions, overcon-
fident managers will understate more surplus as a future 
profit reserve. Therefore, compared with other companies, 
overconfident managers adopt more income smoothing 
methods to cover the real fluctuations of income, the in-
come of the enterprises is smoother, and the information 
asymmetry between enterprises and investors is more seri-
ous. Enterprises must face higher equity financing costs.
Secondly, from the perspective of investors' predictive 
risk mechanism, overconfident executives believe that 
their ability is higher than the industry average, tend to 
overestimate the expected cash flow and return on invest-
ment of the company's projects, and underestimate the 
risk level of project investment. At this point the compa-
ny's risk is increasing. Investors are bound to face higher 
estimated risks when estimating future earnings. Potential 
investors will inevitably demand higher return on invest-
ment, which in turn will represent an increase in corporate 
financing costs. Guangguo Sun and other researchers 
found that managers' overconfidence is negatively cor-
related with the level of corporate accounting stability. 
Especially when the company is in financial distress, the 
overconfident management is more likely to adopt unre-
liable accounting methods such as recognizing income in 
advance and delaying the confirmation of losses. Increase 
the risk that investors estimate future earnings, and thus 
increase the return on investment requirements of poten-
tial investors[18].
Based on the above analysis, the overconfident man-
agement has a more aggressive incentive for earnings con-
trol, and investors estimate that the risk increases, leading 
investors to demand a higher return on investment for 
managers with overconfidence, so we propose hypothesis 
H1:
H1: There is a significant negative correlation between 
executive overconfidence and equity capital costs.
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Because the situation of corporate governance supervi-
sion and restriction faced by state-owned enterprises and 
non-state-owned enterprises is very different, the degree 
of overconfidence of executives with different property 
rights has different effects on the cost of equity financ-
ing. The high concentration of equity in state-owned 
listed companies and the absence of owners are likely to 
lead to internal control, and managers have great rights. 
Compared with private enterprises, executives are more 
likely to form "one-word situation" (deciding everything 
by one man's words) when making decisions. Moreover, 
executives of state-owned listed companies enjoy admin-
istrative levels and are more prone to overconfidence. As 
a result, the degree of executive overconfidence is more 
pronounced in state-owned enterprises. The following is 
an analysis from the information mechanism and on the 
one hand, from the perspective of the information mecha-
nism. Due to the imperfect corporate governance structure 
and internal and external regulatory mechanisms of state-
owned enterprises, it is easy to aggravate the degree of 
overconfidence of state-owned enterprise executives. As 
a result, the overconfidence of state-owned enterprise 
executives has a greater impact on corporate behavior de-
cisions, and there is more room for earnings manipulation. 
When the management of state-owned enterprises faces 
greater financing motives and political pressures, in order 
to cover up the real income situation of enterprises, they 
will adopt more aggressive earnings control methods, thus 
aggravating the information asymmetry between state-
owned enterprises and investors. Further reducing the 
quality of accounting information of state-owned enter-
prises will eventually lead to higher equity financing costs 
for state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, Garmaise 
et al. found that when ineffective corporate governance is 
combined with management opportunistic behavior, the 
company's systemic risk will rise and the cost of equity fi-
nancing will increase.[19] Huang's research findings further 
confirm that higher levels of management encroachment 
will result in higher equity financing costs, as the invest-
ment itself will bear additional agency risks and higher 
monitoring costs [20]. Therefore, from the perspective of 
risk mechanism, compared with other enterprises, be-
cause the degree of overconfidence of executives is more 
prominent in state-owned enterprises, state-owned enter-
prise executives have greater jurisdiction over corporate 
decision-making, leading to greater risks for state-owned 
enterprises. Estimating the risk of future earnings is high-
er, which in turn will increase the return on investment 
requirements of potential investors[21].
Based on the above analysis, we further propose hy-
pothesis H2:
H2: Other conditions remain unchanged. compared 
with private enterprises, the overconfidence of senior ex-
ecutives of state-owned listed companies has a more sig-
nificant impact on the cost of equity financing.
3. Research Samples and Research variables
3.1 Research Samples
This paper selects non-financial A-share listed companies 
with refinancing qualifications in 2012 and 2013 as re-
search samples, and excludes the following companies: (1) 
Companies with CEO changed during the research year; 
(2) Companies with missing financial data, abnormal 
financial indicators, and have been specially treated; (3) 
The companies in the financial and insurance industry; (4) 
companies that issue b shares and H shares at the same 
time; (5) Listed companies but listed for less than 3 years. 
After the above elimination, there are 553 in 2014 and 
612 in 2015, a total of 1,165 observations. Among them, 
53 CEOs were overconfident in 2014 and 69 in 2015, with 
a total of 122 observations.
3.2 Research variables
3.2.1 Managers with Overconfidence
Senior managers with overconfidence: How to accurately 
measure managerial overconfidence is a problem in aca-
demia[4,5]. From the macro environment to the micro-en-
terprise level, domestic and foreign scholars use many al-
ternative indicators to measure manager's overconfidence. 
the most representative surrogate indicators include cEO 
holding status; company earnings forecast deviation; me-
dia evaluation of CEO; business climate indicator; CEO's 
relative compensation, etc. but whether these alternative 
indicators are reasonable is still debatable. considering 
that investment opportunities have a key impact on the 
growth of the company, this paper draws on the methods 
of Malmendier and Tate[4] and Ying Hao[6] to select invest-
ment opportunities to represent the growth opportunities 
of enterprises. Considering the unobservable investment 
opportunities, this paper draws on the methods of domes-
tic and foreign scholars to use the market value book to 
measure the growth opportunities of enterprises than the 
MBA. The MBA for each sample company for each re-
search year is adjusted to the industry median.
Therefore, the criterion for judging the overconfidence 
of executives in this paper is that if the growth of the 
current period is lower than that of the previous period, 
and the number of CEOs' growth increases or remains 
unchanged, the stock trading behavior reflects the CEO's 
growth of the company. Excessively optimistic estimates 
can be used to judge executives' overconfidence, and vice 
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versa to judge that executives are not overconfident.
3.2.2 information Disclosure Quality indicators and 
Control variables
Referring to relevant research, this paper uses the in-
come smoothness to measure the quality of information 
disclosure of listed companies. Since the accrual items 
do not match the cash flow (that is, the correlation co-
efficient between the two is close to zero) is a common 
phenomenon in listed companies. If the directions of the 
two changes are inconsistent and the absolute values of 
the correlation coefficients are large, It may be that the 
listed company is using the difference between the two 
to smooth the income return smoothness, so the degree 
of correlation between the earnings and cash flow of the 
listed company in a certain period of time can be used to 
measure the degree of smoothness of the income. This 
paper draws on the ideas of Leuz et al.[22] and Myers et 
al.[23] to measure the smoothness of returns by using the 
correlation coefficient between quarterly accruals and 
quarterly cash flow changes.
In the research model below, we also control other 
factors that may affect the interpreted variables. Previ-
ous studies have shown that company characteristics 
such as company size and solvency are important factors 
influencing earnings management. In addition, we also 
control corporate characteristic variables such as profit-
ability, growth, operating efficiency, and fixed asset ratio. 
Many studies have shown that the quality of earnings 
information is closely related to the corporate governance 
mechanism. the ownership structure, board structure 
and executive shareholding affect the level of motivation 
for management to implement earnings management. 
Therefore, we use equity concentration, the proportion of 
independent directors and the proportion of CEOs. These 
factors are controlled.
3.2.3 equity Financing Costs and Control variables
Referring to the existing estimation method of equity fi-
nancing cost, this paper uses the residual income model of 
Gebhardt et al.[24], and uses the method of Kangtao Ye et 
al.[25] to estimate the cost of equity financing. In order to 
make the empirical research more accurate, this paper also 
controls the two important variables of β coefficient and 
book market value ratio BM which may affect the cost of 
equity financing.
4. Research Methods and empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the study variables showed that 
the average cost of equity financing was 6.5%, with a me-
dian of 5.4%, a maximum of 11.5%, and a minimum of 
1.2%. The sample company's average return smoothness 
is 0.850, and the median is 0.930, which indicates that the 
sample company's refinancing qualification is smoother, 
which is consistent with the research results of Ying Zeng 
and Zhengfei Lu[17].
4.2 Univariate Grouping Test
In order to test hypothesis H1, we divide the sample 
companies into over-confident enterprise groups and 
non-overconfident enterprise groups according to wheth-
er the CEO is overconfident. The difference between the 
two groups was significant, and the smoothness of the 
overconfident group was greater than that of the non-over-
confident group. Further, the T-test and Wilcoxon test 
results of the mean and median differences between the 
two groups showed that the yield smoothness of the two 
groups was significantly different at the 1% significance 
level. This result shows that the profit smoothness of 
overconfident enterprises is significantly greater than that 
of non-overconfident enterprises, so that our hypothesis 
H1 is initially supported by the univariate test. As a result 
of the difference between the group financing costs, the 
mean and median of the equity financing costs of the two 
groups passed the T test and the Wilcoxon significance 
test, which shows that the CEO's overconfidence of cor-
porate equity financing costs is also significantly greater 
than CEO non-overconfident enterprises. Since no control 
variables were added, the results of the univariate test may 
be overestimated. To make the study more meaningful, we 
further performed a multivariate regression analysis of the 
multivariate test.
4.3 Analysis of CEO with Overconfidence Related 
to earning Smoothness
4.3.1 Analysis of the Impact of CEO Overconfidence 
on earning Smoothness
To test hypothesis H1, we establish the following mod-
el to test the impact of CEO overconfidence on Earning 
smoothness:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
ES Con Size Lev Turn Roa Grow
Tan Board Hold Control Herf
α α α α α α α
α α α α α ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
 (1)
Among them, the interpreted variable Es is the income 
smoothness indicator defined above, and the explanatory 
variable Con is the CEO overconfidence dummy variable. 
to make the inspection more accurate, we control other 
factors that may affect the smoothness of the earnings of 
listed companies. the multi-collinearity test results of the 
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regression model show that the variance expansion factor 
of the regression model is less than 2, Therefore, there is 
no multi-collinearity problem in the setting of the regres-
sion model. 
In order to ensure the robustness of the test results, we 
introduce control variables step by step for regression. 
With the introduction of control variables, the significance 
of the coefficients is significantly enhanced. When the 
income smoothness ES is the explanatory variable, the co-
efficient is always positive and significant at the 1% level, 
which shows that the more CEOs tend to be overconfi-
dent, the smoother the earnings of listed companies and 
the lower the transparency of earnings. So our hypothesis 
1 passes the test.
4.3.2 Analysis of the Impact of CEO Overconfidence 
on the Correlation between earning Smoothness and 
equity Financing Cost
After analyzing the impact of CEO overconfidence on 
the smoothness of listed companies' earnings, we join the 
CEO overconfidence variable and establish the follow-
ing joint multiple regression models to further examine 
whether CEO overconfidence will increase (or weaken) 
the positive correlation between earnings smoothness and 
equity financing costs:
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
r ES Con ES Size
BM Lev Turn Roa Grow
α α α α β α
α α α α α ε
= + + × + +
+ + + + + +
 (2)
Among them, the dependent variable r is the equity 
financing cost, the income transparency ES is the income 
smoothness indicator defined above, and Con is the CEO 
overconfidence dummy variable. To test the hypothesis 
proposed, we establish an interaction term between the 
income smoothness ES and the CEO overconfidence dum-
my variable Con. If the coefficient of the interaction term 
is significantly positive, then our hypothesis H2 holds. In 
order to make the inspection more accurate, we also con-
trol other factors that may affect the cost of equity financ-
ing of listed companies. The multi-collinearity test results 
of the regression model show that the variance expansion 
factors of each variable in the regression model are less 
than 2; therefore, there is no multicollinearity problem in 
the setting of the regression model.
The empirical results show that the size of the firm, the 
book value of the market value and the cost of equity fi-
nancing are significant at the level of 1%, but the relation-
ship between the beta coefficient and the cost of equity 
financing is not significant, which is consistent with the 
empirical results of Ying Zeng and Zhengfei Lu.[17] Finan-
cial leverage is significantly positively correlated with eq-
uity financing costs, indicating that the risk of bankruptcy 
failure increases with the increase of financial leverage, 
and investors must demand higher risk compensation, 
resulting in an increase in equity financing costs[26]. the 
asset turnover rate is significantly negatively correlated 
with the equity financing cost, and the symbol is also in 
line with theoretical expectations. Because the lower the 
asset turnover rates, the worse the business efficiency of 
the company, the more serious the agency problem, the 
higher the investment risk of investors, and therefore the 
higher risk return[27]. the return on assets and the growth 
rate of operating income are significantly related to the 
cost of equity financing. The symbol is consistent with the 
existing research[17,28], indicating that the profitability and 
growth of the enterprise are important factors affecting 
investors' investment decisions.
to test hypothesis H2, we adopt a joint multivariate 
analysis method to test whether CEO overconfidence 
increases the impact of earnings smoothness on equity fi-
nancing costs. the empirical results show that the income 
smoothness is significantly positively correlated with the 
equity financing cost at 5%, indicating that the smooth-
er the return and the higher the cost of equity financing, 
which is consistent with the expected research conclusion.
[8,11] More importantly, the coefficient of CEO overconfi-
dence dummy variable con and income smoothness Es 
interaction term Con*ES is significantly positive at 5% 
level, which shows that CEO overconfidence enhances 
the positive correlation between earnings smoothness and 
equity financing costs, and Hypothesis H2 is verified.
4.3.3 Analysis of the Impact of CEO Overconfidence 
on the Correlation between earning Smoothness and 
equity Financing Costs
In order to further test whether the hypothesis H3 is estab-
lished, on the basis of the above regression analysis, the 
sample companies are classified into state-owned enter-
prises and non-state-owned enterprises in groups accord-
ing to the characteristics of ownership. The results show 
that the coefficient of the interaction term Con*ES in the 
state-owned enterprise group is significantly positive at 
the level of 1%, and in the group of private enterprises, 
the coefficient is only significant at the level of 10%; 
the full sample empirical results show that CEO over-
confidence enhances the impact of earnings smoothness 
on equity financing costs. Further analysis of ownership 
analysis shows that compared with private enterprises, the 
influence of CEO overconfidence is significantly reflected 
in state-owned listed companies. this empirical analysis 
supports hypothesis H3.
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4.4 Robustness Test
In order to enhance the robustness of the research results, 
the paper conducted the following tests: (1) According to 
the existing research and data availability, the CEO's eval-
uation and cEO relative salary are used to measure cEO 
overconfidence, and the empirical results are still valid; (2) 
Using the annual accrual item and cash flow correlation 
coefficient to measure the return smoothness indicator[10], 
the empirical results are still valid; (3) all variables in the 
regression model are tailed out, eliminating 1% of the 
abnormal value before and after, the empirical results Still 
true, the model fit has improved. The above tests show 
that the empirical results of this paper have good robust-
ness.
4.5 Further Analysis: the Potential Mechanism of 
Senior Managers with Overconfidence Affecting 
the Cost of equity Financing
From the previous theoretical analysis, the underlying 
mechanisms of executive overconfidence affecting the 
cost of equity financing are: On the one hand, from the 
perspective of information disclosure, overconfident exec-
utives have more intense aggressive earnings management 
and income smoothing motives, leading to the company. 
The decline in the quality of accounting information has 
aggravated the information asymmetry between managers 
and investors, making enterprises face higher equity fi-
nancing costs[28].
On the other hand, from the perspective of investors' 
predictive risk, overconfident executives believe that their 
ability is higher than the industry average, tend to overes-
timate the expected cash flow and return on investment of 
the company's projects, and underestimate the risk level 
of project investment. The risk increases. Investors are 
bound to face higher estimated risks when estimating fu-
ture earnings. Potential investors will inevitably demand 
higher return on investment, which in turn will represent 
an increase in corporate financing costs.
4.5.1 Analysis of information Disclosure Machine: 
Executive Overconfidence and Quality of Information 
Disclosure
From the regression results, the influence of executive 
overconfidence on the quality of information disclosure 
is significantly positive at the 10% significance level; the 
over-confidence of executives and the quality of informa-
tion disclosure are simultaneously added to the regres-
sion analysis of the cost of equity financing, executive 
over-extension Confidence in the cost of equity financing 
is significant at the 10% level, and the quality of infor-
mation disclosure is significant at the level of 5% equity 
financing. After the quality of information disclosure, the 
influence of over-confidence of executives on the cost 
of equity financing is still significant, and the quality of 
information disclosure on the cost of equity financing 
and over-confidence of executives is significant for infor-
mation disclosure. combined with the above regression 
results, the quality of information disclosure is The in-
fluence of executive overconfidence on the cost of equity 
financing has a partial mediating effect.
4.5.2 investor Forecasting Risk Perspective Analysis: 
Executive Overconfidence and Corporate Risk
From the above analysis, investors predict that risk is an-
other potential mechanism for executives' overconfidence 
to affect the cost of equity financing. When executives are 
overconfident, they will overestimate the expected cash 
flow and return on investment of the company's projects, 
and underestimate the risk of project investment. Levels 
lead to increased company risk. When investors predict 
that the company's risk will increase, potential investors 
will inevitably demand a higher return on investment, 
which in turn will increase the cost of corporate finance, 
so it can be expected that the risk of executives with over-
confidence will increase. The empirical results show that 
the level of surplus volatility is used to represent the com-
pany's risk. The influence of executive overconfidence on 
earnings volatility is significantly positively correlated at 
the 10% level, indicating that the executive's overconfi-
dence tends to increase the level of surplus volatility and 
increase the company's Corporate risk; joining the compa-
ny's risk factors, executive overconfidence is significantly 
positive for equity financing costs at 5%, while corporate 
risk is significant at 5% for equity financing costs, in sum-
mary the investor's forecast risk is also high The influence 
of overconfidence on the cost of equity financing has a 
partial mediating effect.
5. Conclusion
this paper takes the chinese listed company with the 
equity refinancing qualification from 2012 to 2013 as 
the research object, and uses the residual income model 
to calculate the equity financing cost, drawing on the re-
search ideas of Bhattacharya et al.[11] this paper uses the 
income smoothness index to measure the transparency of 
listed companies' earnings, and examines the impact of 
CEO overconfidence on the quality of listed companies' 
information disclosure and the economic consequences.
Notes: since the research sample selected in this paper 
is an already listed company, the first financing has been 
completed. Therefore, unless otherwise stated, the equity 
financing cost in this article refers to the cost (or potential 
financing cost) of the listed company's equity refinancing.
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